An abuse-of-dominance investigation.

The question

The authority’s preliminary view was that loyalty rebates and exclusive supplier terms had raised barriers for smaller platforms. The company needed to show whether its conduct was capable of foreclosing an equally efficient competitor, and whether the relevant market was as narrow as the regulator suggested.

Our approach

We assembled eighteen million basket-level transactions and supplier contracts, estimated diversion between online and in-store channels, and applied an as-efficient-competitor price–cost test to each rebate scheme. Every step was documented so the authority’s economists could replicate our results on their own data.

The evidence

Our submissions showed strong switching between channels, widening the market well beyond online grocery. The price–cost test found that rebates cleared the relevant cost benchmark in every period, and the authority’s own economists replicated the core results during a state-of-play meeting.

The outcome

The authority narrowed its theory of harm and ultimately closed the investigation on the basis of limited voluntary commitments on supplier exclusivity. No infringement finding was made, and the company’s loyalty programme continued without modification.

Market definition is where most dominance cases are quietly won or lost.